RFC4387
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Operational Protocols: Certificate Store Access via HTTP
The protocol conventions described in this document satisfy some of the operational requirements of the Internet Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). This document specifies the conventions for using the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/HTTPS) as an interface mechanism to obtain certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs) from PKI repositories. Additional mechanisms addressing PKIX operational requirements are specified in separate documents. [STANDARDS TRACK]
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RFC 4387 Certificate Store Access via HTTP February 2006 2.5.3. URI Notes Pre-constructed URIs that fetch a certificate/public key matching a fixed search criterion may be useful for items such as web pages or business cards, or even for technical support/helpdesk staff who want to mail to users but can't find the certificate themselves. These URIs may also be used to enforce privacy measures when distributing certificates by perturbing the search key in a manner known only to the certificate/public key store, or to the certificate store and users (in other words, by converting the URI into a capability). For example, a user with a newly-issued certificate could be instructed to fetch it with a key of "x-encrCertHash=...", which is decrypted by the certificate store to fetch the appropriate certificate, ensuring that only the certificate owner can fetch their certificate immediately after issue. Similarly, an organisation that doesn't want to make its certificates available for public query might require a MAC on search keys (e.g., "x-macCertHash=...") to ensure that only authorised users can search for certificates (although a more logical place for access control, if a true web server is being used to access the store, would obviously be at the HTTP level). The query types have been specifically chosen to be not just an HTTP interface to LDAP but a general-purpose retrieval mechanism that allows arbitrary certificate/public key storage mechanisms (with a bias towards simple {key,value} stores, which are deployed almost universally, whether as ISAM, Berkeley DB, or an RDBMS) to be employed as back-ends. This specification has been deliberately written to be technology neutral, allowing any {key,value} lookup mechanism to be used. It doesn't matter if you choose to have trained chimpanzees look up certificates in books of tables, as long as your method can provide the correct response with reasonable efficiency. Certificate/public key and CRL stores are allocated separate URIs because they may be implemented using different mechanisms. A certificate store typically contains large numbers of small items, while a CRL store contains a very small number of potentially large items. By providing independent URIs, it's possible to implement the two stores using mechanisms tailored to the data they contain. PGP combines key and revocation information into a single data object so that it's possible to return both public keys and revocation information from the same URI. If distinct key and revocation servers are available, these can provide a slight performance gain since fetching revocation information doesn't require fetching the key that it applies to. If no separate servers are available, a Gutmann Standards Track [Page 10]
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